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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 2002103 8-SC 
v. : Ct. App. No. 20010988-CA 
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' split decision 
below in State v. Samora (Samora II), 2002 UT App 384, 59 P.3d 604 (attached in 
Addendum A).1 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because illegal sentences are void ab initio, they may be vacated at any time under 
rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and do not limit the range of resentencing 
'A copy of State v. Samora (Samora I), 2001 UT App 266 (memorandum 
decision), which is also relevant to this appeal, is attached as Addendum B. 
on remand. Can a sentence be illegal for purposes of 22(e), but nevertheless limit the 
range of resentencing on remand? 
The interpretation of a rule is a question of law, reviewable for correctness. Brown 
v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 15, 16 P.3d 540. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is relevant to this petition: 'The 
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any 
time." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 
On April 18,2000, defendant was charged with unlawful control over a motor 
vehicle with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (1998). R. 2-3. On August 8, 2000, 
Judge Robin Reese took defendant's guilty plea to attempted unlawful control over a 
motor vehicle, a class A misdemeanor. R. 63:5. At the plea-taking, defendant agreed to 
pay restitution to the victim, his former girlfriend. R. 63:3. 
Judge Reese told defendant to make an appointment with Adult Probation and 
Parole for preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI) and notified defendant 
of his September 22, 2000 sentencing hearing before Judge J. Dennis Frederick. R. 63:8. 
2This statement of the case borrows freely from Judge Russell W. Bench's 
dissenting opinion. To facilitate readability, quotation marks are not used. 
2 
Defendant failed to appear for preparation of his PSI or for sentencing. R. 41, 64:2. At 
sentencing, Judge Frederick found that defendant had voluntarily failed to appear. 
R. 64:2. No sentencing information was presented at the proceeding, and Judge Frederick 
imposed the maximum jail time and fine. See R. 42-43, 64. 
On first appeal, the court of appeals vacated defendant's sentence. State v. Samora 
(Samora I), 2001 UT App 266 (memorandum opinion) (included in the record at R. 92) 
(attached in Addendum B). The court of appeals vacated, despite defendant's status as a 
fugitive, holding that defendant's sentence was "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner" 
under rule 22(e), subject to correction at any time. Id. at f 3 & n.l.3 
At the resentencing hearing, defendant appeared and affirmatively asserted that, 
under his plea agreement, he owed restitution. R. 122:3-4. He said that he owed about 
$900, maybe "a little higher," although the victim testified that $744.80 would cover her 
losses. Id. at 4-6. Judge Frederick ordered defendant to pay the lesser sum in restitution, 
plus the maximum jail time and fine. R. 94-95. Apparently, defendant had hoped that he 
would be ordered to pay only restitution and no fine. Defendant's attorney made the 
following statement to the court: 
[I]t would be my request on behalf of Mr. Samora that the Court do a 
couple of things. One, that the Court would waive the fine. There is some 
restitution owing that was part of the negotiation in this case to the victim. 
They've—Mr. Samora and the victim in this case had a fairly long-term 
3Because Samora I is a memorandum decision, its paragraphs are not numbered. 
The State has numbered the paragraphs to facilitate citation. 
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relationship before this all happened and there was, as a part of the 
negotiation, he's to pay some restitution with respect to that. 
We'd ask the Court to—to waive or at least to reduce the fine 
substantially and—and ask that the Court give him credit for time served on 
this case. 
R. 122:3-4. Defendant never claimed below that the imposition of restitution, in addition 
to the fine, would violate due process or Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999). 
Defendant brought a second appeal, claiming that imposition of restitution violated 
his statutory and constitutional rights. Br. Aplt in Case No. 20010988-CA, at 1-2. In a 
split decision, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that defendant's new 
sentence was presumptively vindictive. Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, at f 19. The final 
paragraph of the court's decision makes this enigmatic statement about jurisdiction and 
preservation: "We conclude that we have jurisdiction in this case despite Defendant's 
failure to preserve the issues before the trial court because the trial court illegally imposed 
sentence in the first sentencing. Alternatively, there was plain error in imposing 
sentence."4 Id. atf 23. 
4The State also argued below that the new sentence was proper under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(a) (1999), which allows for an increased sentence when it is "based 
on facts which were not known to the court at the time of the original sentence." The 
court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that the sentencing court should have 
reviewed the record, including defendant's plea statement in which he agreed to pay 
restitution. Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, at ffl| 20, 21. 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to the probable cause statement, defendant was drinking at his 
girlfriend's home, became angry, and drove away in her car without her permission. R. 3. 
Defendant's relative telephoned the following day and gave the girlfriend the vehicle's 
location. Id. She then retrieved the vehicle. Id. 
According to testimony given at resentencing, defendant destroyed a fence while 
driving the vehicle. R. 122:6. Collection proceedings for the value of the fence had been 
initiated against defendant's girlfriend, affecting her credit rating. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred when it created a new class of sentences which are 
illegal for one purpose (access to review), but not for another (effect on resentencing). 
The new class of sentences, labeled "sentences imposed in an illegal manner," is contrary 
to rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which treats "illegal sentences" and 
"sentences imposed in an illegal manner" equally. The new class is inconsistent with this 
Court's precedent and is contrary to sound policy. In cases involving alleged procedural 
error at sentencing, it will effectively eviscerate preservation rules and may even abrogate 
the requirement for a timely notice of appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CREATED A NEW CLASS OF RULE 
22(e) SENTENCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRECEDENT 
ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT AND CONTRARY TO SOUND 
POLICY 
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that a "court may correct 
an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." This Court 
has invoked this rule only to permit correction of manifestly illegal sentences. 
In its decision below, the court of appeals created a new class of rule 22(e) 
sentences—sentences which are illegal for one purpose, but not for another. The court of 
appeals' decision labels defendant's original sentence as "a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner" and treats it as an illegal sentence for one purpose (access to review), but not for 
another (effect on resentencing). This decision is contrary to rule 22(e), which treats "an 
illegal sentence" and "a sentence impose in an illegal manner" equally. The decision is 
also incompatible with this Court's decisions which have never treated a sentence as 
illegal for one purpose but not for another, and it is inconsistent with the rationale 
expressed by this Court in State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991). Finally, it is 
contrary to the dictates of sound policy. 
A. The court of appeals has created a hybrid category of sentencing error with 
characteristics of both ordinary sentencing error and rule 22(e) sentencing 
error. 
This Court's precedent delineates two kinds of sentencing error, each with its own 
procedures and rules of review. Almost always, this Court addresses "ordinary 
sentencing error," and the ordinary rules of appellate review apply. Occasionally, this 
Court addresses rule 22(e) "illegal sentences." Because illegal sentences are void, they 
are reviewed under a different set of rules. This Court has not addressed the difference, if 
any, between "an illegal sentence" and "a sentence imposed in an equal manner," but has 
treated them equally. 
1. Ordinary sentencing error. 
Ordinary sentencing error occurs when a trial court errs during sentencing or 
abuses its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence. For instance, a court may 
impose consecutive sentences without considering statutorily-mandated factors. See State 
v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ffl| 8-9,40 P.3d 626. A court may impose restitution for offenses 
for which a defendant was not convicted and did not admit responsibility. See State v. 
Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937-938 (Utah 1998). In a rare case, a court may impose a sentence 
"so inherently unfair" that "no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." State v. Gerrard, 548 P.2d 885, 887-888 (Utah 1978). These are all examples of 
ordinary sentencing error. 
Where ordinary sentencing error occurs, all parties must follow the rules governing 
appellate review. 
• The defendant must file a timely notice of appeal. 
• The defendant must preserve the issue, usually by making an objection in the trial 
court. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. (Utah 1995). If he does not, 
7 
he must demonstrate "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances" to justify review 
of his claim. See id. 
The State may not appeal defendant-favorable error. For instance, while a 
defendant may claim that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive 
sentences, the State may not claim that the court erred when it imposed concurrent, 
rather than consecutive sentences. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (1999). While 
a defendant may claim that a sentence imposed was so harsh that no reasonable 
judge would have imposed it, the State cannot claim that the sentence was so 
lenient that no reasonable judge would have imposed it. See id. 
Under most circumstances, a trial court may not impose a harsher sentence when 
an original sentence is vacated upon a successful appeal. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-405 (1999); State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ffif 73-74, 979 P.2d 799; State v. 
Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180-181 (Utah 1981). The purpose of this rule is "to 
assure that there is no chilling or deterring of the criminal defendant's exercise of 
his basic constitutional right to appeal." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at ^  73 (quoting 
Sorensen, 639 P.2d at 181). The defendant is the only party who has the 
prerogative to seek review of ordinary sentencing error. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18a-1. The possibility that a decision to appeal might lead to a harsher sentence 
could deter the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to appeal. 
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2. Rule 22(e) sentencing error. 
This Court has addressed rule 22(e) sentences in a number of cases, including State 
v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996), State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d at 86-88, and 
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389-1390 (Utah 1988). In all of these cases, the trial 
court imposed a sentence that did not conform to the governing statute. See Babbel, 813 
P.2d at 86 (statute provided for minimum mandatory term, but trial court imposed 
indeterminate term); Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 551 (statute did not authorize the 
consecutive, determinate two-year enhancement that the trial court imposed); Lorrah, 761 
P.2d at 1390 (trial court imposed sentence "not to exceed ten years," but statute mandated 
minimum mandatory sentence of five, ten, or fifteen years).5 
Where an illegal sentence has been imposed, all parties must follow the rules and 
procedures governing the correction of an illegal sentence. These rules, which are laid 
out in rule 22(e) and this Court's precedent, differ markedly from the rules governing the 
appeal of ordinary sentencing error. 
• A party may move to correct an illegal sentence at any time whether or not the 
issue has been preserved, whether or not the party can demonstrate plain error or 
exceptional circumstances, and whether or not a timely notice of appeal has been 
filed. "[A]n illegal sentence is void." Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88. Because it is void it 
5This Court has also rejected claims that sentences were illegal in a number of 
cases. See State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 8, 994 P.2d 1243; State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 
856, 858-860 (Utah 1995); State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Wareham, 801 P.2d 918, 919-920 & n.2 (Utah 1990). 
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can be corrected "at any time." See id.; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). A trial 
court "ha[s] the power to correct an illegal sentence 'at any time whether before or 
after an appeal, and even if there is no appeal.'" State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88). An appellate court can also vacate 
an illegal sentence discovered during an appeal. "Because an illegal sentence is 
void," a challenge to a sentence's legality is "raisable at any time." Id. 
Because an illegal sentence is void, it is "of no legal effect." Babbel, 813 P.2d at 
88. It "creates no rights and neither impair[s] nor affect[s] any right." Id. 
The State, as well as the defendant, may seek correction of an illegal sentence. Id. 
at 86. Apparently, the trial court may, on its own initiative, correct an illegal 
sentence. See Lorrah,16\ P.2dat 1389-1390. 
A vacated illegal sentence does not limit the court's sentencing discretion at 
resentencing. When a new sentence is imposed, it is, in effect, an original 
sentence. The void and vacated sentence does not circumscribe or otherwise affect 
the trial court's prerogatives at resentencing. The trial court may therefore impose 
a legal sentence "regardless of whether the correction involves an increase" in 
severity. See Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Further, the possibility of a harsher sentence following vacation of an 
illegal sentence does not chill a defendant's constitutional right to appeal. While 
only the defendant can decide whether to seek review of ordinary sentencing error, 
either may party seek correction of an illegal sentence. Because a defendant 
10 
cannot prevent the State from seeking correction of an illegal sentence, his 
decision to appeal does not open the only conduit to review of an illegal sentence. 
His sentence can be corrected before or after his appeal and even if he does not 
appeal. Because the possibility of a harsher sentence exists independent of the 
defendant's decision to seek or forego an appeal, the possibility of a harsher 
sentence does not deter the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to 
appeal. 
This Court has not definitively addressed the difference, if any, between "an illegal 
sentence" and "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner." This Court had held, however, 
that the purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow correction of "manifestly illegal sentences."6 
State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, f 5, 48 P.3d 228. Further, this Court has held that "rule 
22(e) claims are not restricted by time limits for bringing a notice of appeal." Id. "Nor 
are they waived by failure to raise them at the first opportunity before the district court." 
Id. "For this reason, rule 22(e) claims must be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse." 
Id. 
6
"Manifestly" means plainly, obviously, or evidently. A sentence is imposed in a 
manifestly illegal manner when the illegality can be "readily and instantly perceived." 
See Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged). Thus, the illegality 
should be evident without a search of the record and a determination of what rights may 
or may not have been waived. 
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Thus, rule 22(e) "allow[s] correction of manifestly illegal sentences." Telford, 
2002 UT 51 at ^  5. Likewise, rule 22(e) allows correction of sentences imposed in a 
manifestly illegal manner. 
Moreover, when a sentence is imposed in a manifestly illegal manner (perhaps 
without jurisdiction), the resulting sentence, like an illegal sentence that does not conform 
to the offense, must be treated as void. See Telford, 2002 UT 51 at f 5 n.l ("rule 22(e) 
may be employed to correct a sentence under circumstances where the sentencing court 
had no jurisdiction, or to correct a sentence beyond the authorized statutory range"). Like 
an illegal sentence, a sentence imposed in an illegal manner cannot create legal rights or 
limit the range of sentencing at remand.7 
7The State could find no case from this Court specifically defining what rule 22(e) 
means by a sentence "imposed in an illegal manner." The State therefore does not 
attempt to propose an exhaustive list of circumstances in which a sentence may be 
imposed "in an illegal manner." It is clear, however, that the circumstances in which a 
sentence could be so characterized are few. It could be argued, for example, that a 
sentence that conforms to the crime, but is imposed by a court without jurisdiction, is a 
sentence imposed in a manifestly illegal manner. See Telford, 2002 UT 51 atf 5 n.l. 
Further, while the terminology "imposed in an illegal manner" is used in the rules 
and statutes of other jurisdictions, precedent from those jurisdictions should be viewed 
with caution. In most jurisdictions, sentences imposed in an illegal manner are 
reviewable only within a limited period after the sentence is imposed. See, e.g., Ark. 
Code Ann. § 6-90-111 (West 2001) (ninety days); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-31-1 (West 
2002) (one year). Where illegally imposed sentences are correctable at any time, as they 
are in Utah, categorizing a sentence as illegally imposed implicates different policy 
considerations than it does in jurisdictions that limit the review period. 
12 
3. The court of appeals' hybrid sentencing error. 
The court of appeals' decision below effectively splits rule 22(e) sentences into 
two groups: (I) illegal sentences—meaning they can be corrected at any time, they are 
void, and they do not limit the severity of a new sentence imposed after they have been 
vacated, and (2) "sentences imposed in an illegal manner"—meaning they too can be 
corrected at any time, but they apparently are not void because they do limit the severity 
of new sentences imposed after they have been vacated. Thus, while an illegal sentence 
has no legal effect and creates no rights, " a sentence imposed in an illegal manner" does 
have a legal effect and does create new rights. 
As a result, the sentence imposed in an illegal manner, as defined by the court of 
appeals, is a new creature. It is, in fact, a hybrid, having some characteristics of ordinary 
sentencing error and some characteristics of rule 22(e) sentencing error. 
This hybrid is the best of all possible worlds for a defendant. It allows the 
defendant to challenge sentencing error at any time—apparently even years after it 
occurs. A defendant can challenge the error without preserving it below or demonstrating 
plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. He can apparently challenge the error 
even though he does not file a notice of appeal. 
But, once the sentence is challenged, the ordinary strictures of appellate review 
apply. The sentence is not, like an illegal sentence, void. Rather, it creates legal rights 
that limit the range of sentencing on remand. On remand, the trial court can impose a 
sentence no more severe than the original sentence. 
13 
Although the court of appeals has taken a phrase from rule 22(e) to give its hybrid 
a name, the hybrid is without the theoretical moorings that explain and govern rule 22(e) 
sentences. The court of appeals has, in fact, created a class of sentences that eviscerates 
the preservation rules and likely abrogates the ordinary requirements for filing a timely 
notice of appeal. At least with respect to claimed errors that occur during sentencing, the 
decision in this case turns the ordinary appellate process on its head. This Court should 
re-clarify the limited scope of rule 22(e) review and the consequences that follow 
invocation of the rule. 
B. The court of appeals9 error here is the culmination of a line of cases unduly 
expanding the scope of rule 22(e). 
L Wanosik, Samora I, and Samora II. 
The court of appeals cited two of its own cases to support its decision here. A 
review of those cases may help explain how and why the court erred. In the first case, 
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615, the court of appeals addressed a 
defendant's claim that the trial court failed to comply with rule 22(a), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, when it did not solicit sentencing input from defense counsel and the 
prosecutor.8 Id. at f 27. Responding to the State's argument that Wanosik had to show 
plain error with regard to this claim because he had not preserved it below, the court of 
8This Court granted the State's petition for certiorari in Wanosik. The case has 
now been briefed, argued, and submitted. It addresses sentencing-in-absentia issues; it 
touches secondarily on rule 22(e) issues. This Court may or may not reach the rule 22(e) 
issues briefed in Wanosik, and its decision may or may not dispose of the rule 22(e) issue 
raised here. 
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appeals stated, "We observe 'that rule 22(e) [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] 
permits the court of appeals to consider the legality of a sentence even if the issue is 
raised for the first time on appeal.'" Id. at f 28 n.l 1 (quoting State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 
856, 860 (Utah 1995)). The court of appeals then concluded that the trial court had not 
complied with rule 22(a). Id. at f 32. Thus, the court of appeals held, a sentence imposed 
in a proceeding where defense counsel and the prosecutor were not invited to speak, was 
an illegal sentence. 
In State v. Samora (Samora I), 2001 UT App 266 (memorandum decision) 
(attached as Addendum B), which followed, the issue arose again. In that case, 
defendant was sentenced in absentia and remained a fugitive when defense counsel 
brought the appeal. Id. The State argued that defendant's appeal should be dismissed, 
subject to reinstatement if he returned to the jurisdiction. Id. The court of appeals 
rejected this argument, holding that Wanosik was dispositive and required a remand for 
resentencing. Id. The court of appeals observed, "Even if we were to dismiss the appeal, 
Samora could challenge the sentence in the trial court under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure." Id. at n.l (citing Wanosik, 241 UT App 241 at f 28 n.l 1). The 
court quoted the language of rule 22(e): "The Court may correct... a sentence imposed 
in an illegal manner, at any time." Id. The court also cited Wanosik, referencing its 
holding that "issues regarding illegality of the sentence under Rule 22(a) can be 
considered for the first time on appeal under Rule 22(e)." Id. Apparently, the court did 
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not make any distinction between "illegal sentences" and "sentences imposed in an illegal 
manner." 
The case was remanded, and defendant was resentenced. At resentencing, the trial 
judge imposed a restitution order that had not been imposed at the earlier sentencing. 
Compare R. 94-95 with R. 42-43, 64. Defendant again appealed, arguing that the new 
sentence was presumptively vindictive and contrary to statutory and case law proscribing 
harsher sentences following successful appeals. State v. Samora (Samora II), 2002 UT 
App 384, 59 P.3d 604. The court of appeals agreed and reversed. Id. at f 23. In its 
decision, the court of appeals rejected the State's argument that the presumption of 
vindictiveness is not applicable when illegal sentences are corrected. Id. at ffl| 15-16. The 
court reasoned, "The [original] sentence itself was not illegal, but the manner in which it 
was imposed was contrary to law."9 Id. at % 16. In its conclusion, the court of appeals 
again stated that "the trial court illegally imposed sentence in the first sentencing." Id. at 
f 23. Here, for the first time in this line of cases, the court separated the two phrases in 
rule 22(e), and, for the first time, treated them as different classes of sentences. 
9
 The full context is this: "Defendant's resentencing did not result from an original 
sentence contrary to statutory minimum mandatory requirements. Rather, Defendant's 
original sentence was vacated because he was sentenced in absentia. The sentence itself 
was not illegal, but the manner in which it was imposed was contrary to law." Samora II, 
2002 UT App 384 at f 16. The statement demonstrates the court of appeals' expansive 
view of rule 22(e). In Wanosik, the court of appeals found rule 22(e) error in the failure 
to solicit sentencing input. Here, the court has widened its view. Apparently, as 
articulated by the court of appeals in the instant case, rule 22(e) error—not ordinary 
appellate error—occurs even when a defendant is sentenced in absentia. 
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2. Other court of appeals9 decisions. 
The holdings in the Samora line of cases are only some in a growing number 
suggesting the court of appeals' willingness to extend the reach of rule 22(e). In 
extending the sweep of rule 22(e), however, the court of appeals has not examined the 
ramifications of its broad reading of the rule. The following decisions are illustrative: 
• In State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah App. 1991), the court of appeals implicitly 
held that a trial court's failure to order that a defendant be mentally examined prior 
to sentencing could constitute rule 22(e) error. 
In State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994), the court held that the 
defendant's claim that he had been improperly denied the return of fees did not 
constitute a rule 22(e) error. Unfortunately, in defining an "illegal sentence," the 
court cited habeas corpus cases addressing Shondel, equal protection, and due 
process challenges. 
• In State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1998), the court erroneously held 
that rule 22(e) permitted review of the defendant's merger claim. See State v. 
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 8, 994 P.2d 1243 (addressing the court of appeals' 
error). 
• In State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, 975 P.2d 476, the court properly reviewed 
the defendant's preserved claim that his sentencing violated double jeopardy. The 
court suggested in dicta, however, that absent preservation the issue would be 
reviewable pursuant to rule 22(e). Id. at % 6 n. 1. 
• In State v. Burr, 2000 UT App 288 (memorandum opinion) (attached in 
Addendum C), the court addressed the defendant's rule 22 claim that his 
"sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because he was not personally 
provided with a copy of the presentence report." Id. at f 2. While the court 
rejected the claim on the merits, it did not question the propriety of the rule 22(e) 
route to review. 
In State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 (memorandum opinion) (attached in Addendum 
D), the court of appeals attempted to distinguish between illegal sentences and sentences 
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imposed in an illegal manner. In so doing, the court cited foreign authority suggesting 
that sentences imposed in an illegal manner are "those that are within statutory and 
jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's rights." Id. at f 2 & n.2. Five of the six 
cases cited by the Headley court as authority for an expansive reading of "sentences 
imposed in an illegal manner" come from jurisdictions where that expansive reading is 
tempered by rules that limit the period for review of sentences imposed in an illegal 
manner. See United States .v Katzin, 824 F.2d. 234, 237 (3rd Cir. 1987) (120 days); 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 299 n.3 (3rd Cir. [V.I.] 2001) 
(120 days); State v. Sieler, 554 N.W.2d 477,479 (S.D. 1996) (120 days); State v. 
Anderson, 661 P.2d 716, 720 (Haw. App. 1983) (90 days); State v. Brooks, 589 A.2d 444, 
446 (Me. 1991) (one year). Categorizing a sentence as "imposed in an illegal manner" in 
those jurisdictions has different consequences and policy implications than it does in a 
jurisdiction like Utah with no time limit.10 
C. Assuming the error here must be treated as rule 22(e) error, it must be 
treated as rule 22(e) error for all purposes, including remand. 
The court of appeals probably erred when, in Samora I, it defined defendant's 
original sentence as a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. That decision may now be 
{0Headley also cited this Court's 1972 decision in Kuehnert v. Turner, 499 P.2d 
839 (Utah 1972), a habeas case, where this Court remanded a case to the district court for 
resentencing upon a showing that the defendant was sentenced without counsel present. 
While this Court referred to the Kuehnert's sentence as "invalid," it never referred to rule 
22(e) nor to its implications. Id. at 841. Rather, it found that the defendant had 
demonstrated in his habeas proceeding that he had been deprived of a constitutional right 
and that the deprivation was harmful. Id. at 839-840. 
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"law of the case" and not remediable.11 See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.$ 
Inc., 2003 UT 23, U 25, _ P.3d _ (citing Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 
1037 (Utah 1995)) ("Under the law of the case doctrine, 'a decision made on an issue 
during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation."^). 
But the court of appeals, circumscribed by its own error, created even greater error in this 
case by defining a new class of sentences that, while not "manifestly illegally" and while 
not "imposed in a manifestly illegal manner," are subject to correction at any time, but are 
not void, and therefore create legal rights that limit the range of sentencing on remand.12 
This Court should take this opportunity to clarify what constitutes a rule 22(e) 
sentence and to explain that rule 22(e)'s reference to "a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner" does not create a new class of sentencing error eviscerating the ordinary rules of 
appellate review. 
With respect to this defendant, where the court of appeals determined that the 
original sentence constituted rule 22(e) error and where that determination is now "law of 
1 lThe State did not seek certiorari review of Samora L The court of appeals issued 
its memorandum decision in the case on September 7, 2001. While the State disagreed 
with the holding and reasoning in the case, the State did not believe that the unpublished 
decision created binding precedent. On March 8, 2002, seven months later, this Court 
issued its decision in Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, 44 P.3d 734. In that 
decision, this Court took "the opportunity to correct the misimpression that the Judicial 
Council ha[d] authority to adopt rules governing the use of memorandum decisions in the 
appellate process" and to clarify that "decisions of the court of appeals expressed in a 
memorandum decision, or in an opinion, are equally binding upon the lower courts of this 
state" and "may be presented as precedential authority to a lower court or as persuasive 
authority to this court." Id. at f 16. 
nSee Judge Bench's dissenting opinion, Samora II, 2002 UT App 384 at ffl[ 25-33. 
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the case," this Court should hold that the trial court did not err when it imposed a 
corrected sentence within the statutory limits, even though that sentence may have been 
more severe than defendant's original sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the decision below and provide clarification on the reach 
of rule 22(e) and the rules governing the review of rule 22(e) sentences, including 
"sentence[s] imposed in an illegal manner." 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ^ _ June 2003. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
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Paue 1 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Manuel Ernesto SAMORA, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20010988-CA. 
Nov 15,2002 
Defendant pled guilty to attempted joyriding with 
intent to temporarily deprive owner After his 
original sentence was vacated on appeal, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, J Dennis 
Frederick, J , resentenced defendant Defendant 
appealed The Court of Appeals, Pamela T 
Greenwood, J , held that (1) order imposmg 
restitution at resentencing was presumptively 
vindictive, (2) defendant's reference to restitution at 
resentencing hearing was insufficient to rebut 
presumption of vmdictiveness, and (3) trial court was 
precluded from imposing harsher sentence on remand 
without specifying reasons for deviating from 
prohibition against imposmg harsher sentences on 
remand following appeal 
Sentence vacated, remanded 
Russell W Bench, J , filed dissenting opinion. 
West Headnotes 
111 Constitutional Law 
92k270( 1) Most Cited Cases 
[11 Sentencing and Punishment C - ^ 6 
150Hk6 Most Cited Cases 
The burden is on the State to establish that a 
defendant's harsher sentence on remand does not 
violate the requirements of due process and the 
statute governing sentencing on remand U S C A 
Const Amend 14, U C A 1953, 76-3-405 
[21 Constitutional Law €=^270(3) 
92k270(3) Most Cited Cases 
[21 Sentencing and Punishment 
"oQHkl 15(4) Most Cited Cases 
Imposition of restitution on remand after defendant's 
original sentence for attempted joyriding with intent 
to temporarily deprive owner, imposed in absentia, 
was vacated on appeal, was presumptively vindictive 
under resentencing statute and due process insofar as 
allowing imposition of harsher sentence on retrial 
after original sentence imposed in absentia was 
vacated would have had chilling effect on right to 
appeal I S C \ Const Amend 14. L C \ 19^ "6-
3-405 
[31 Sentencing and Punishment ^ ^ 1 1 5 ( 4 ) 
350Hkl 15(4) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's request at resentencing hearing for 
attempted joyriding with intent to temporarily 
depnve owner, that trial court significantly reduce 
fine so that he could instead pay restitution, was 
insufficient, by itself, to rebut presumption of 
vmdictiveness arising from imposition of harsher 
sentence on remand after original sentence, illegally 
imposed in absentia, was vacated UC A 1953, 76-3-
405 
141 Sentencing and Punishment € ^ 1 1 5 ( 4 ) 
350Hkl 15(4) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's reference to payment of restitution did 
not constitute facts that were unknown at time of 
original sentencing hearing, so as to warrant 
imposition of harsher sentence on remand by 
ordering restitution at resentencing after original 
sentence, which did not require restitution, was 
vacated on appeal, issue of restitution had been raised 
at plea hearing prior to onginal sentencing 
UC A 1953, 76-3-405(2)(a) 
[51 Sentencing and Punishment €~^115(4) 
3SQHU 15(4) Most Cited Cases 
Trial court was precluded from imposing order of 
restitution on remand after ongmal sentence for 
attempted joyriding with intent to temporarily 
deprive owner, which did not require restitution, was 
vacated, without specifying basis for deviating from 
statute prohibiting imposition of harsher sentences on 
retrial after original sentence has been vacated on 
appeal U C A 1953 76-3-405 
*604 Joan C Watt and John K West, Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Mark L Shurtleif, Attorney General, and Jeanne B 
Inouye, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee 
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*605 OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge 
**1 K 1 Manuel Ernesto Samora (Defendant) 
appeals from a sentence for attempted joyriding with 
intent to temporarily deprive owner, a class A 
misdemeanor, in \ lolation of Utah Code Ann § 41-
la-1314 (1998) and Ltah Code \nn. $ 76-4-101 
(1999). Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in 
imposing a harsher sentence following reversal of his 
original sentence on appeal. We vacate Defendant's 
sentence and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 On August 8, 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to 
attempted unlawful control of a motor vehicle with 
intent to temporarily deprive owner. As part of his 
plea agreement with the State, Defendant agreed to 
pay restitution to the victim. The trial court accepted 
Defendant's guilty plea and agreed to release him on 
his own recognizance pending sentencing. The trial 
court set sentencing for September 22, 2000, in front 
of a different trial judge. When Defendant failed to 
appear for his September 22 sentencing, the trial 
court sentenced him in absentia to the statutory 
maximum one-year sentence, imposed a fine of 
$2500, a surcharge, and attorney fees. The trial 
court did not impose restitution. 
t 3 Defendant appealed his sentence in absentia, 
claiming it violated due process and Rule 22(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. On September 7, 
2001, this court m a per curiam opinion vacated 
Defendant's sentence and remanded his case for 
resentencing in accordance with State v Wanosik. 
2001 VI App 241. 31 P3d 615. cert granted, 42 
P 3d 951 (Utah 2002) fFNll 
FN1 Wanosik held that due process and 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) 
require a trial court to conduct adequate 
inquiry into the actual voluntariness of 
Defendant's absence before proceeding to 
sentence in absentia 2001 UT App 241. 1| 
37-38,31 P 3d 615 
K 4 On November 16, 2001, Defendant appeared for 
resentencing before the judge who previously 
sentenced him During resentencing, defense 
counsel requested that the trial court v\aive or 
substantially reduce Defendant's fine so Defendant 
could pay the restitution that he originally agreed to 
as part of the plea negotiation Defense counsel also 
requested that Defendant be granted credit for the six 
months he had served on his sentence awaiting the 
original appellate disposition. 
U 5 After taking testimony regarding the restitution 
amount owing, the trial court resentenced Defendant 
to the maximum one-year jail term, denying 
Defendant good-time credit for the six months he had 
served. The court again imposed the maximum 
$2500 fine, a surcharge, and attorney fees In 
addition, the court ordered that Defendant pay 
$744.80 in restitution. 
% 6 Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider 
Sentence asking the trial court to reconsider its denial 
of credit for time served. The trial court granted 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and gave him 
credit for the time he had served. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
% 7 Defendant claims the trial court erred by 
imposing restitution at resentencing when restitution 
was not imposed as part of Defendant's original 
sentence. Because sentencing errors involve 
questions of law, we review for correctness. See 
State v Kenison. 2000 UT App 322. <[ 7. 14 P 3d 
129. 
ANALYSIS 
[ij % 8 Defendant argues that the trial court erred 
when it imposed restitution at resentencing without 
waiving or substantially reducing the fine Defendant 
owed. He contends that due process and Utah Code 
Ann § 76-3- 405 (1999), preclude the imposition of 
a harsher sentence after a case is reversed on appeal. 
The State argues that Defendant invited any 
sentencing error when he declared his obligation to 
pay restitution. Alternatively, the State asserts that 
the trial court may increase the penalties upon 
resentencing when the original sentence was illegal 
or is based on facts not known to the court at the time 
of the ongmal sentencing. [FN2] 
FN2 The burden is on the State to establish 
that Defendant's harsher sentence did not 
violate the requirements of due process and 
section 76- 3-405 See \orth Ciuohna \ 
Peaicc. 395 US 711, 726, 89 S Ct 2072, 
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*606 **2 H 9 In Xotth Catolina v Peace. 395 U S 
711. 725 S9 S O 2072. 2080. 23 L Ed 2d 656 
(1969), the Supreme Court held that when 
resentencing a defendant, due process prevents the 
sentencing judge from increasing the sentence when 
that increase is motivated by vmdictiveness To free 
defendants from the apprehension of such a 
retaliatory motivation, the Supreme Court held that 
"whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence 
upon a defendant," the reasons must affirmatively 
appear on the record and "be based upon objective 
information concerning identifiable conduct on the 
part of the defendant occurring after the tune of the 
original sentencing proceeding " Id at 766. 89 S Ct 
at 2081 But see Texas v McCullottzh. 475 U S 
134. 140-42. 106 S Ct 976. 980-81 (1986) (stating 
that language "[restricting justifications for a 
sentence increase to only 'events that occurred 
subsequent to the onginal proceeding' " was not 
"intended to describe exhaustively all of the possible 
circumstances in which a sentence increase could be 
justified."). 
U 10 The Utah Code also addresses limitations on 
resentencing, as follows: 
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set 
aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the 
court shall not impose a new sentence for the same 
offense or for a different offense based on the same 
conduct which is more severe than the prior 
sentence less the portion of the prior sentence 
previously satisfied. 
(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which 
were not known to the court at the time of the 
original sentence, and the court affirmatively 
places on the record the facts which provide the 
basis for the increased sentence;.... 
Ltah Code Ann » 76-3-405. 
H 11 In State v Sorensen. 639 P 2d 179. 180 (Utah 
1981). the supreme court discussed the requirements 
of due process and section 76-3-405 in relation to 
resentencing. The supreme court held that section 
76-3-405 
prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal 
(Article VIII, § 9) from being impaired "by 
imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the 
error of his conviction the risk that he may be 
penalized with a harsher sentence for having done 
so. 
!£ (quoting Chess v Smith. 617 P 2d 341. 343 
(Utah 1980)) 
In the context of the due process requirement of 
Noith Carol ma \> Peaicr. [395 1 £ "1 1 _89 S (J_ 
2072]. which seeks to assure that there is no 
chilling or deterring of the criminal defendant's 
exercise of his basic constitutional right to appeal, 
and in light of the Utah constitutional constraint 
against impairing the right to appeal, as articulated 
m Chess v Smith [617 P 2d 3411 we think the 
meaning of our statutory prohibition against a 
"more severe" second sentence is clear The 
second sentence cannot exceed the first in 
appearance or effect, in the number of its elements, 
U C A . 1953, § 76-3-201. or in their magnitude 
Sorensen. 639 P 2d at 181 (alterations in original). 
**3 H 12 Our supreme court has also observed that 
section 76-3-405 is "more stringent than the due 
process protection [and] 'allows for no exceptions' " 
State v Bakalov. 1999 UT 45. «f 73. 979 P 2d 799 
(quoting Sorensen. 639 P2d at 180) Although the 
State agrees that as a general rule a sentence imposed 
after a successful appeal cannot be more severe than 
the prior sentence, it argues that Defendant's case is 
different because he invited any error by volunteering 
that he owed restitution. 
% 13 Defendant acknowledges he did not argue at 
resentencing that the trial court was precluded from 
imposing a harsher sentence on resentencing 
However, Defendant asserts plain error on appeal. 
The State counters, and our dissenting colleague 
agrees, that Defendant invited error by initiating the 
discussion of restitution and acknowledging that it 
was owed. Accordingly, the State asserts that a plain 
error analysis is not available. See State v Perdue. 
813 P.2d 1201. 1206 (Utah CtAppl991) (stating 
invited*607 error defeats claim of plain error) We 
have two initial responses. First, as noted in 
Wanosik. rule 22(e) permits this court to consider 
whether a defendant was illegally sentenced " 'even if 
the issue is raised for the first time on appeal' " State 
v Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241. f 28 n 11. 31 P 3d 
615. cert granted, 42 P 3d 9^ 1 (Utah 2002) (quoting 
State v Brooks. 908 P 2d 856. 860 (Utah 1995)) 
Second, the colloquy between the trial court and 
Defendant's counsel lacked sufficient clarity to 
construe it as an invitation or stipulation for the trial 
court to violate section 76-3-405 [FN3] 
FN3. We discuss the colloquy in more detail 
later in this opinion. 
f 14 We acknowledge that Defendant did not 
provide a plam error analysis in his brief, alluding to 
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it only in the standard of review section, perhaps 
relying on the proposition stated in IVanosik and 
Bwok. that the issue did not need to be preserved in 
the trial court. As noted in the dissenting opinion, 
plain error will be found only if the appellant 
establishes that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful...." Suite v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993). The third factor is clearly 
established because Defendant received a more harsh 
sentence on resentencing. We next examine the first 
factor, whether error occurred, because that analysis 
is necessary to a plain error evaluation and also 
necessary if we have jurisdiction under Wanosik and 
Brook. We note that this issue is addressed in 
Defendant's brief. 
[2] K 15 We begin our analysis by determining 
whether the presumption of vindictiveness as 
described in Pearce is applicable. See Pearce. 395 
U.S. at 725. 89 S.Ct. at 2080: State v. Babbel. 813 
P.2d 86, 87 (Utah 1991). The State argues that the 
principles underlying Pearce are not applicable in 
this case because Defendant's original sentence was 
illegal, and under Babbel. id. at 88. an illegal 
sentence is void and not subject to the sentence 
protections articulated in Pearce. Sorensen. Chess. 
and section 76-3-405. However, we find the State's 
reliance on Babbel to be misplaced. 
**4 f 16 In Babbel, the defendant was sentenced to 
a term less than the applicable statute's minimum 
mandatory requirements. 813 P.2d86. The supreme 
court concluded that the principles underlying 
Pearce, Sorensen, Chess, and section 76-3-405 did 
not apply because a defendant is unlikely to appeal a 
sentence that is unlawfully lenient, so there is a 
"minimal chilling effect on the right to appeal." Id. at 
88. Unlike Babbel. Defendant's resentencing did not 
result from an original sentence contrary to statutory 
minimum mandatory requirements. Rather, 
Defendant's original sentence was vacated because he 
was sentenced in absentia. The sentence itself was 
not illegal, but the manner in which it was imposed 
was contrary to law. Furthermore, allowing a harsher 
sentence when the original sentence was imposed in 
an illegal manner would have a "chilling effect on the 
right to appeal," id^ and impair the Utah 
Constitution's guaranty of the right to appeal. See 
Sorensen, 639 P.2d at 181. Therefore, because 
Babbel is not applicable, we conclude that the due 
process discussion in Pearce. Sorensen. and Chess 
require us to apply a presumption of vindictiveness. 
Accordingly, we next consider whether the 
presumption is successfully rebutted. [FN4] 
FX4. The State's brief does not address the 
Pearce presumption of vindictiveness, 
arguing instead that because the original 
sentencing court did not know about 
restitution agreed to in the plea negotiations, 
the imposition of restitution at resentencing 
was necessarily nonretaliatory. 
13 [ 1[ 17 During resentencing the following colloquy 
took place: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: [Mr. Samora] would like 
the Court to be aware of some of the things that 
he's been doing while he's been incarcerated. He 
served two months in jail before he was sentenced 
originally on this case and then he served an 
additional approximately four months, I think, 
since-
MR. SAMORA: Six. Six months. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Six months. And it 
would be-
THE COURT: While you were pursuing the 
appeal? 
*608 DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I mean, the point is, I 
guess, made. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: [I]t would be my request 
on behalf of Mr. Samora that the Court do a couple 
of things. One, that the Court would waive the 
fine. There is some restitution owing that was part 
of the negotiation in this case to the victim.... Mr. 
Samora and the victim in the case had a fairly long-
term relationship before this all happened and there 
was, as part of the negotiation, he's to pay some 
restitution with respect to that. 
We'd ask the Court to-to waive or at least to 
reduce the fine substantially and-and ask that the 
Court give him credit for time served on this case. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.... 
K 18 After receiving the victim's testimony 
regarding the amount of restitution owed, the trial 
judge imposed the maximum one-year sentence, 
$2500 fine, a surcharge, and attorney fees. The court 
also ordered Defendant to pay $744.80 in restitution, 
without any reduction in the fine, as Defendant had 
requested. The trial judge initially denied 
Defendant's request for credit for the six months he 
had already served on his one-year sentence, but 
relented after Defendant filed his Motion to 
Reconsider Sentence. 
**5 Ii 19 The State argues that although Defendant 
"may have hoped for a reduction in his fine," the 
record does not indicate that his agreement to pay 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Page 5 
restitution was conditioned on such a reduction 
However, after reading the sentencing proceeding 
transcript in context, it is apparent that Defendant 
was asking the trial court to waive or substantially 
reduce his fine so that Defendant could instead pay 
restitution It is unreasonable to believe that 
Defendant volunteered to assume responsibility for 
restitution, which if imposed would substantially 
increase the monetary amount of Defendant's 
sentence, on the mere hope that his fine would be 
waived or reduced Furthermore, given extant case 
law and section 76-3-405, Defendant was not 
required to submit to a restitution order as part of 
resentencing, nor was the trial court empowered to 
order the same Given the record we have before us, 
we cannot conclude that the presumption of 
vindictiveness has been rebutted. Therefore, error 
occurred because Defendant received a harsher 
sentence after exercising his constitutional right to 
appeal his original sentence. 
[4] % 20 The State, however, also argues that 
Defendant's harsher sentence was appropriate under 
Utah Code Ann. 5 76-3-405(2 )(a). which allows for 
an increased sentence when it is "based on facts 
which were not known to the court at the time of the 
onginal sentence." The State argues that because the 
trial judge did not review the record, which included 
Defendant's obligation to pay restitution, before 
originally sentencing Defendant, the prohibition 
against a harsher sentence does not apply. We 
disagree. 
f 21 The record discloses that restitution was 
discussed at Defendant's plea hearing. In addition, 
the record includes the "Statement of Defendant, 
Certificate of Counsel and Order," signed by 
Defendant, in which he agrees to pay restitution. 
The State cannot claim that the facts regarding 
restitution were unknown at the tune of the onginal 
sentencing because the trial judge did not review the 
record before sentencing Defendant. A trial judge, 
like every other party to a proceeding, is charged 
with knowledge of what is in the record. Therefore, 
the trial judge's failure to familiarize himself with the 
record in this case does not satisfy the lack of 
knowledge requirement found in section 76-3-405. 
Furthermore, as noted in the per curiam opinion 
vacating Defendant's original sentence, the trial court 
at the original sentencing did not provide an 
opportunity for Defendant's counsel or the State to 
provide any information relevant to sentencing. See 
State v Samota, 2001 UT App 266 (per curiam). 
Li] K 22 Having concluded that error occurred, we 
now turn to whether "the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court" Dunn, 350 P 2d at 1208 
Section 76-3-405, federal case law, Bakah\_ and 
Sort nsen clearly prohibit a harsher sentence on 
resentencing absent specific circumstances The trial 
court did not address nor specify any basis for 
deviating from that mandate *609 Therefore, the 
error should have been recognized by the trial court 
CONCLUSION 
**6 % 23 We conclude that we have jurisdiction in 
this case despite Defendant's failure to preserve the 
issues before the trial court because the trial court 
illegally imposed sentence in the first sentencing 
Alternatively, there was plain error in imposing 
sentence. Given the record before us, we conclude 
that the presumption of vindictiveness or retaliation 
has not been rebutted and Defendant received a 
harsher sentence on resentencing m derogation of 
section 76-3-405 and principles of due process 
Therefore, we reverse and remand for sentencing in 
accordance with this opinion. At resentencing, the 
restitution order must be eliminated, or at Defendant's 
option and with the dial court's agreement, die fine 
may be reduced by the amount of restitution. 
1 24 I CONCUR: NORMAN H JACKSON. 
Presiding Judge. 
BENCH. Judge (dissenting): 
% 25 I see this case much differently dian do my 
colleagues. 
H 26 Judge Robin W. Reese took Defendant's plea. 
In that proceeding, Defendant agreed to pay 
restitution to the victim, his former girlfriend 
Sentencing was then scheduled before Judge J 
Dennis Frederick. When Defendant failed to appear 
for sentencing, Judge Fredenck sentenced him in 
absentia. No sentencing information was presented 
at that proceeding, and Judge Fredenck imposed the 
maximum jail time and fine. On the first appeal, this 
court reversed Defendant's sentence in accordance 
with State v Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, 31 P 3d 
615, cert granted, 42 P 3d 951 (Utah 2002). We 
then remanded the case for resentencing. 
% 27 At the resentencing hearing, Defendant 
appeared and affirmatively asserted that, under his 
plea agreement, he owed restitution. He said he 
owed about $900, maybe "a little higher," although 
the victim testified that $744 80 would cover her 
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State v Samora (Samora II), 2002 U 1 App 384, w v j a 0U4 
losses Judge Frederick ordered Defendant to pay 
the lesser sum in restitution, plus the maximum jail 
time and fine Apparently, Defendant had hoped that 
he would be ordered to pay just the restitution and no 
fine Defendant's attorney made the following 
statement to the court-
It would be my request on behalf of Mr Samora 
that the Court do a couple of things One, that the 
Court would waive the fine There is some 
restitution owing that was part of the negotiation m 
this case to the victim. They've—Mr Samora and 
the victim in the case had a fairly long-term 
relationship before this all happened and there was, 
as a part of the negotiation, [an agreement] to pay 
some restitution with respect to that. 
We'd ask the Court to-to waive or at least to 
reduce the fine substantially and-and ask that the 
Court give him credit for time served on this case. 
K 28 Defendant never claimed below that the 
imposition of restitution, in addition to the fine, 
would violate due process or Utah Code Ann, fr 76-
3-405(1999). Because Defendant did not raise this 
issue below, we are precluded from addressing it 
unless Defendant can demonstrate that exceptional 
circumstances exist or plain error occurred. See 
State v Holmte. 2000 UT 74.1| 11. 10 P 3d 346. On 
appeal, Defendant mentions plain error in reciting 
what he believes to be the applicable standard of 
review, but does not even purport to demonstrate how 
the trial court plainly erred. We, therefore, are 
precluded from addressing the issue. 
**7 f 29 We would be precluded from addressing 
the issue even if Defendant had articulated a plain 
error argument on appeal. "To establish plain error, 
an appellant must demonstrate that '(0 an error exists, 
(n) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court, and (in) the error is harmful/ " State v Pecht. 
2002 UT 41,f 18. 48 P 3d 931 (quoting State v 
Dunn. 850 P 2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). Plam 
error, however, can never be urged when the 
appellant affirmatively invites the court's ruling. See 
State v Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201. 1206 (Utah 
Ct App 1991) (stating that "where invited error butts 
up against manifest injustice [or plam error], the *610 
invited error rule prevailsM). "The doctrine of invited 
error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial 
and then complaining of it on appeal/ " Id at 1205 
(citation omitted). Otherwise, a criminal defendant 
could invite prejudicial error and "implant it in the 
record as a form of appellate insurance. ." State v 
Pafsons 781 P2d 1275. 1285 (Utah 1989) In this 
case, Defendant affirmatively raised the issue of 
restitution and agreed that restitution was owing He 
did not claim that, if restitution were ordered, he had 
a due process or statutory entitlement to a reduction 
in the fine Given how he invited the court to 
impose restitution, Defendant is now in no position to 
challenge it on appeal See Pet due 81 "* P 2d at 
1205 
U 30 Even if we could properly reach the merits of 
Defendant's contention on appeal, the argument fails 
because the first sentence had no legal effect At 
resentencing, the trial court was therefore not limited 
by the terms of the first sentence See Stare v 
Babbel 813 P2d 86. 88 (Utah 1991) (stating that " 
'[t]he rule followed by most jurisdictions is that an 
unlawful sentence is of no legal effect, allowing the 
court to correct the sentence by imposing lawful 
terms at any time the illegality is discovered, 
regardless of whether the correction involves an 
increase' ") (quoting Annotation, Powei of Court to 
Increase Seventy of Unlawful Sentence-Modern 
Status. 28 A L R 4th 147. 152 (1984)). 
K 31 The mam opinion is wrong in trying to 
distinguish this case from Babbel In Babbel. the 
Utah Supreme Court cited the statute that preceded 
rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
for the proposition that the trial court can " 'correct an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time/ " Babbel. 813 P2d at 87 
(citation omitted). The supreme court stated that 
"[t]he correction of an illegal sentence stands on a 
different footing from the correction of an error in a 
conviction " Id at 88 Therefore, the court held that 
"the principles underlying" the cases holding that 
federal due process prohibits a harsher sentence from 
being imposed m a second trial for the same offense 
after a reversal of the first conviction, "have no 
application [to t]he correction of an illegal sentence " 
IL 
**8 f 32 The initial sentence in the present case was 
illegal because it was improperly imposed in 
Defendant's absence. That was precisely how the 
first appeal was argued. When we remanded the 
case, we expressly noted that the court may correct 
an illegal sentence at any time See State v Samora. 
2001 UT App 266 at n 1 (per curiam) (unpublished 
mem. decision) (referring to Utah R Cnm P 22(e)) 
My colleagues cannot now change course and hold 
that a sentence imposed contrary to law is not an 
illegal sentence. Rule 22(e) itself treats equally "an 
illegal sentence" and "a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner " Utah R Cnm P 22(e) Because 
this case involves an illegal sentence, there can be no 
presumption of vindictiveness as described in \oith 
Catohna v Pcaue. 395 US 711. 89 SCt 2072 
(1969) See Babbel 813 P 2d at 87-88 When it 
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resentenced Defendant, the trial court was therefore 
not limited by the terms of the prior sentence. See 
id., see also Texas v. McCullowzh. 475 U.S. 134. 106 
S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986) (quoting United 
States v Goodwin. 457 U.S. 368, 374. 102 S.Ct. 
2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982), for the proposition that 
"[n]othing in the Constitution requires a judge to 
ignore 'objective information ... justifying the 
increased sentence'"). 
^ 33 Accordingly, I would affirm the sentencing 
order. 
59 P.3d 604, 2002 WL 31545759 (Utah App.), 460 
Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 2002 UT 384 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Manuel Ernesto SAMORA, Defendant and 
Appellant 
No. 20000884-CA. 
Sept 7, 2001 
Joan C Watt and John K West, Salt Lake City, for 
appellant 
Mark L Shurtleff, Jeanne B Inouye, and Kevin 
Murphy, Salt Lake City, for appellee 
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and ORME, ]J 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM 
*1 Appellant Manuel Ernesto Samora appeals the 
sentence on his conviction of Attempted Joyriding, a 
class A misdemeanor 
The issues raised m Samora's appeal are the same 
issues determined in State v Wanosik, 2001 UT App 
241 428 Utah Ad\ Rep 10, regarding sentencing in 
absentia and a criminal defendant's Utah Rule ot 
Criminal Piocedure 22(a) and Due Process nghts 
Accordmgly, Samora is entitled to be resentenced 
under Wanosik because the district court did not (1) 
make an adequate inquiry into the actual 
voluntariness of Samora's absence before proceeding 
to sentence him in absentia, (2) provide Samora the 
opportunity to present information through counsel in 
mitigation of punishment and also provide the 
prosecutor an opportunity to present information 
relevant to sentencing, and (3) base the sentencing 
decision on relevant and reliable information 
regarding the cnme, defendant's background, and the 
interests of society See id at^U 36-38 
The State seeks dismissal of this appeal, relying 
upon cases concluding that an appeal taken by a 
criminal defendant who is a fugitive may be 
dismissed, subject to reinstatement if the defendant 
returns to the jurisdiction and if the State cannot 
demonstrate that it will be prejudiced by 
reinstatement See eg State \ Tuttle 713 P 2d "'O \ 
~*Q^ (Ltah 1985) Because Wanosik is dispositive of 
Samora's appeal and requires a remand for 
resentencing, we decline to dismiss this appeal 
[FN lj However, if Samora appeals the sentence 
imposed after remand, the State may raise the 
dismissal argument in the subsequent appeal 
FN1 Even if we were to dismiss this appeal, 
Samora could challenge the sentence in the 
trial court under Rule 22(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure See Utah 
R Cnm P 22(e) ("The court may correct 
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at 
any time "), see also Wanosik, 241 UT App 
241 at n 11 (stating issues regarding 
illegality of the sentence under Rule 22(a) 
can be considered for the first time on 
appeal under Rule 22(e)) Judicial economy 
suggests that we resolve the appeal from the 
sentence and preserve the State's ability to 
seek dismissal in any appeal taken after 
resentencmg 
We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing 
in accordance with Wanosik 
2001 WL 1021098 (Utah App ), 2001 UT App 266 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert C. Burr, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000336-CA 
F I L E D 
October 19, 2000 
2000 UTApp 288 
Second District, Ogden Department 
The Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan 
Attorneys: 
Robert C. Burr, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
L. Dean Saunders, Ogden, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Robert C. Burr appeals the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 22 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. This case is before the court on the State's motion for summary affirmance. 
The sentence imposed was within statutory limits; however, Burr contends the sentence was imposed in an illegal 
manner because he was not personally provided with a copy of the presentence report. The sentencing transcript 
reflects that the trial court confirmed that defense counsel had the opportunity to review the presentence report. 
The trial judge also asked Burr whether he understood the sentencing recommendation made in the report, and 
Burr responded in the affirmative. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(b)(i) (1999) states that "the court, prosecutor, and the defendant ojihisattorney shall 
be provided with" the written presentence report. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6)(a) 
(1999) states, in part, that "fthe department shall provide the presentence report to the defendant's attorney, or 
the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review three working days prior to 
sentencing." (Emphasis added); see also Neel v. Holden. 886 P.2d 1097, 1102 n.4 (Utah 1996) (stating section 
77-18-1 (6)(a) requires that "the defendant or the defendant's attorney be provided, prior to sentencing, with a 
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/mds/burr.htm 5/27/2003 
written presentence report") Burr cites no authority for his claim that the court must affirmatively determine 
whether a defendant who is represented by counsel has personally received or actually reviewed the report Burr 
failed to establish that his sentence was either illegal or imposed in an illegal manner, and the trial court did not 
err in denying the motion 
The State also argues that Burr failed to timely move to withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code Ann § 77-13-6 
(1999) Burr did not file any motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court, and the issue is not properly before 
this court on appeal The request to withdraw the guilty plea was based solely upon the Rule 22(e) motion See 
State v Arviso, 1999 UT App 381 /H1J9-11, 993 P 2d 894 (holding guilty plea may be withdrawn in the limited 
circumstance where plea bargain contemplated a particular sentence subsequently determined to be illegal) 
Having determined that the sentence was not illegal or imposed in an illegal manner, there is no basis from which 
to conclude that Burr should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea 
Affirmed. 
Norman H Jackson, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinlons/mds^urrhtm 5/27/2003 
Addendum D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas C. Headley, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 990462-CA 
F I L E D 
February 28, 2002 
ll 2002 UT App 58 \\ 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Tyrone Medley 
Attorneys: 
Edward R. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Thomas Brunker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Thorne. 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
Thomas Headley appeals the district court's denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence submitted under Rule 
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. He contends the district court erred in ruling that his motion did 
"not attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed." Headley's 
contention is two-fold: (1) his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance; and (2) the sentencing court 
relied on information in the presentence report that the court knew was false. We affirm. 
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a legal question that we review for correctness, see State v._Brooks, 908 
P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 384-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), and we can affirm 
the decision "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." State v. Finlayson. 2000 
UT 10J31, 994 P.2d 1243. Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for resentencing when a 
sentence is illegal or "imposed in an illegal manner." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). The definition of an "illegal sentence" 
has been construed narrowly to include only sentences "where the sentence does not conform to the crime of 
which the defendant has been convicted."*1 ) State v. Parker. 872 P.2d 1041,1043 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Utah 
law has no comprehensive definition of sentences "imposed in an illegal manner"; however, the Utah Supreme 
Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during sentencing.*2* See Kuehnertv, Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150, 499 P.2d 839, 841 
(1975) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because the defendant did not have counsel at sentencing, was 
not informed of his Sixth Amendment rights during sentencing, and had not knowingly and intelligently waived his 
Sixth Amendment rights) In Kuehnert, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the presence of counsel at 
sentencing is necessary 
so that there is a real opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation of the offense or in 
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as to correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the 
defendant's past record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its administration and enforcement 
of penal laws 
Id at 840-41 
Headley first claims his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance, thus depriving him of his Sixth 
Amendment right To support his claim, Headley makes six assertions, four are as follows (1) he asserts that his 
challenge to misinformation in the presentence investigation report was rejected by the sentencing court because 
it was poorly handled by sentencing counsel, (2) he challenges several factual statements contained in the 
presentence investigation report; (3) he asserts that "his own counsel accused him of being involved in incest 
when that information was not otherwise before the court", and (4) he asserts that "his [sentencing] counsel 
convinced a witness with potentially exculpatory evidence not to cooperate with [Headley]" Each of these four 
assertions has some connection with the presentence investigation report, which is not in the record on appeal 
Further, no other information in the record supports these assertions Accordingly, as discussed below, we are 
unable to address them 
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court imposed a $10,000 fine without reason and without objection by his 
counsel We find no mention of a $10,000 fine in the record The only fines mentioned in the sentencing context, a 
$1,000 recoupment fee and an unspecified amount to "pay for costs of extradition and for therapy of victim," are 
found in the sentencing transcript and the Judgment filed three days later Finally, Headley alleges that "his 
counsel intentionally tried to prevent him from pursuing an appeal" However, the record reflects that Headley filed 
a notice of appeal on September 24,1992, but voluntarily moved to dismiss his appeal to "file a motion to 
withdraw his plea of guilty" Headley's motion was granted on October 8,1992, and the record contains no 
indication of subsequent attempts to appeal the case 
Without the presentence report or other information which may or may not be in the sentencing court record, the 
record submitted to us is inadequate for our review of Headley's ineffective assistance claim All we have are 
Headley's unilateral, bald assertions of misconduct As we have stated, 
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of 
supporting such allegation by an adequate record Absent that record, a defendant's assignment of 
error stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing court has no power to determine [An 
appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts 
unsupported by the record Consequently, in the face of an [inadequate record on appeal, [we] 
must assume the regularity of the proceedings below 
State v Penman, 964 P 2d 1157,1162 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original), 
see also State v Litherland. 2000 UT 76J17,12 P 3d 92 ("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, 
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel 
performed effectively"). Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth Amendment claim 
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court was biased because it relied on information in the presentence report 
that the court knew was false Utah Code Ann § 77-18-1(6) (Supp 2001) gives a sentencing judge discretion in 
evaluating information in a presentence report and requires the judge to "make a determination of relevance and 
accuracy on the record" Here, the sentencing judge made a determination of the relevance and accuracy of the 
presentence report, deciding the presentence report was "comprehensive in all the details," and stating that those 
working on elements of the presentence report "do a pretty good job " The sentencing court has broad discretion 
to resolve factual disputes for or against a defendant, see id , and we cannot say the court exceeded its discretion 
in making this determination Further, without the presentence report, the record is inadequate and "'[we] must 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below '" Penman. 964 P 2d at 1162 (citation omitted) (alteration in 
original) 
5/27/2003 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Headtey's Rule 22(e) motion for resentencing. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
William A. Thome Jr., Judge 
GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the result): 
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but would affirm on what I perceive to be a more straightforward 
basis. As stated by the majority, the trial court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion because the motion did "not 
attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed." The trial court 
was correct. 
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and erroneous fact findings by the sentencing judge are 
simply not cognizable under Rule 22(e). Defendant has not cited any caselaw holding otherwise and has also not 
offered any reasoned analysis for why Rule 22(e) should apply to his case. See State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 
305 (Utah 1998) (briefs must include "reasoned analysis based on [cited] authority"). The sentence imposed was 
permissible under applicable statutes, and the trial court properly resolved factual disputes presented to it. 
Defendant raises no claims legitimately related to whether the sentence was illegal or "imposed in an illegal 
manner." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). On that basis, I would affirm. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. Nonconforming sentences include those where the sentence exceeds the statutory limits. See, e.g.. State v. 
Higginbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because statute only 
authorized one year enhancement and the court enhanced sentence by two years); State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 
381, 388 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the sentence was illegal because it exceeded statutory term). 
Nonconforming sentences also occur when the court is without jurisdiction to impose a sentence. See, e.g.. Sjate 
v. Hurst, 777 P.2d 1029,1036 n.6 (Utah 1989) (stating that sentences can be attacked when beyond the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court); State v. Arviso. 1999 UT App 381,HH5-8, 993 P.2d 894 (stating that the 
sentence was illegal because Supremacy Clause deprived sentencing court of jurisdiction); State v. Grate. 947 
P.2d 1161,1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the sentence was illegal because court did not have 
jurisdiction to revoke probation). 
2. Other jurisdictions have defined sentences imposed in an illegal manner as those that are within statutory and 
jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's rights, se_et e.g., Government of the V.I, v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 
299 n.3 (3rd Cir. 2001); State v. McNellis. 546 A.2d 292, 305-06 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Sieler, 554 
N.W.2d 447,479 (S.D. 1996); ct State v. Anderson. 661 P.2d 716, 720-24 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Brooks. 
589 A.2d 444, 447 (Maine 1991); or that are based on erroneous information. See, e.g.. United States v. Katzin. 
824 F 2d 234, 238 (3rd Cir 1987) 
3 Kuehnert, which discusses illegal sentences under the rules in force prior to Rule 22(e), was not cited in the 
parties' briefs 
4 See also McConneliv Rhay, 393 US 2, 4, 89 S Ct 32, 33-34 (1968) ("As we said in Mempa[ v Rhay, 389 
US 128, 135, 88 S Ct 254, 257 (1967)], 'the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing 
evidence of mitigating circumstances[,] and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as to 
sentence is apparent' The right to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, be treated like the right to counsel at 
other stages of adjudication " (Citation omitted )) 
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